Bryant University

Bryant Digital Repository
Economics Faculty Journal Articles

Economics Faculty Publications and Research

7-2021

The Effect of Task Choice and Task Assignment on the Gender
Earnings Gap: An Experimental Study
Kai Ou
Xiaofei Pan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/econ_jou
Part of the Other Economics Commons

European Economic Review 136 (2021) 103753

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

European Economic Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/euroecorev

The effect of task choice and task assignment on the gender
earnings gap: An experimental studyR
Kai Ou a,1,∗, Xiaofei Pan b,1
a
b

Department of Political Science, Florida State University 554 Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2230
Department of Economics, Bryant University Faculty Suite F, Room 2420. 1150 Douglas Pike, Smithﬁeld, RI, 02917

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 1 June 2020
Revised 29 January 2021
Accepted 30 April 2021

JEL classiﬁcation:
C91
J16
J24
J31
M52
Keywords:
Task choice effect
Task assignment effect
Gender
Experiment

a b s t r a c t
Previous studies explain the gender earnings gap by gender differences in choosing competitive and higher-paying jobs. However, little is known about whether and how women’s
earnings are affected when they choose more challenging jobs. In this study, we use a
novel identiﬁcation strategy to investigate 1) how the gender earnings gap arises from individuals’ self-selecting into different tasks and 2) whether mobilizing women to work on
the tasks typically preferred by men increases women’s earnings and decreases the earnings gap. Our results show that men who prefer the hard and higher-paid task are more
likely to obtain higher earnings regardless of the task they are assigned. In contrast, we
ﬁnd that women obtain higher earnings when they work on a hard and higher-paid task
even if their initial take choice is the easy and lower-paid one. Our ﬁndings are consistent
and robust across task stereotypes. Our results imply that mobilizing women to work on
more challenging and rewarding tasks is likely to reduce the gender earnings gap.
© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
The gender wage gap has been well-documented as a phenomenon that persists across occupations (Azmat and Ferrer,
2017; Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). In exploring the reasons behind this phenomenon, some studies have found that labor market discrimination or attitudes perpetuating stereotypes towards women help explain the gap (Goldin and Rouse,
20 0 0; Neumark, 2018). Other studies have shown that women enter negotiations less often and/or fare worse when they
do negotiate (Dittrich et al., 2014; Leibbrandt and List, 2015). In an experimental setting, studies have found that women
are generally less likely to engage in competition than men, which they posit contributes to the gender wage gap (Flory
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et al., 2015; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).2 However, a recent study on the gig economy continues to document a gap
even when the above factors are barely present (Cook et al., 2020). Other experimental studies show that gender differences affect how individuals choose between easier or challenging tasks, which may also contribute to gender earnings gap.
Buser et al. (2014) ﬁnd that women are less likely to choose prestigious academic tracks, Bracha and Fershtman (2013) suggest women are likely to spend less time on challenging and rewarding tasks than their male counterparts, and Niederle and
Yestrumskas (2008) conclude men choose a challenging task much more frequently than women, even in situations where
both genders have equal ability. These studies suggest that, compared to men, women are less likely to self-select into more
challenging and higher-paid jobs. If high-performing women are disproportionately left out from higher-paying jobs, then
we might expect a large gender earnings gap. Our study contributes to research exploring the factors impacting the gender
wage gap through examining: a) the extent there are gender differences in the choice of a diﬃcult task and b) the ways in
which a simple intervention such as manipulating task assignment impacts subsequent earnings.
It is possible that even if women change their job choices, they may not be able to reduce the gender earnings gap due
to stereotypes based on cultural and social norms as well as occupation patterns and political institutions. For example,
Blau and Kahn (2017) ﬁnd evidence of both occupation segregation (e.g., greater concentrations of women in administrative
support and service positions) and labor market discrimination (e.g., hiring that caters to an employer, co-worker, or customer preferences). In other words, even if a woman prefers a competitive, risk-seeking position, cultural and social factors
may make it diﬃcult for women to obtain and succeed in such a position. Indeed, Bowles et al. (2007) ﬁnd that women
who initiate negotiations are penalized more by male evaluators. Moreover, Babcock et al. (2017) suggest that women are
more likely to accept assignments with a lower potential for promotion than men, hindering their ability to move up in an
organization. In a study of women who do have higher positions and pay, Ong et al. (2019) ﬁnd that these women are more
likely to face a penalty in terms of marriage and children.
Given the discouraging landscape facing women seeking to reduce the wage gap, our study examines the effectiveness of
an institutional intervention, such as Aﬃrmative Action, that would make women more willing to opt-in without considering
cultural norms or potential social costs. If men earn more because they choose a harder and more rewarding task and
women earn less because they choose an easier and less rewarding task, we are interested in whether motivating women
to choose the harder task will have a resultant positive impact on their earnings. At a broader level, encouraging women to
choose these tasks could contribute to the earnings of high-ability women who are left out in the current system and even
improve aggregate social welfare.
While understanding whether the gender earnings gap would be reduced if more women worked on challenging and
rewarding tasks would provide critical insight for both scholars and policymakers, there are currently limited studies examining these questions due to at least two empirical challenges. First, to address these questions, we need to manipulate
individual job choices while excluding other factors that might be associated with the task selection decision-making process, which is exceedingly diﬃcult to ﬁnd in observational data or to implement in a natural or ﬁeld experiment. Second,
we need to generate an appropriate counterfactual to observe how women would have performed had their job choice been
different. In naturally-occurring situations, we are empirically and ethically unable to know what individuals would do in
such a counterfactual world.3
Our study addresses these issues by using a novel and unique research design to explore whether and how having men
and women work on jobs that they would not have chosen in the ﬁrst place results in a positive effect on reducing the
gender earnings gap. To elicit individuals’ preferences on task choices in our experimental study, we asked participants to
indicate if they preferred a hard and higher-paid piece-rate task or an easy and lower-paid piece-rate task. To establish the
appropriate counterfactual, 55% of participants were assigned their preferred tasks, while the other 45% of participants were
assigned the tasks they did not choose.4 Participants have incentives to sincerely report their preferred tasks because they
are more likely to be assigned a task they choose. We establish the counterfactual by investigating the performance and
earnings of those participants who are assigned non-preferred tasks.
Speciﬁcally, our study focuses on three effects that may contribute to the gender earnings gap: 1) Task Choice Effect. We
compare earnings within women (men) who chose different tasks yet were assigned the same task to address whether those
who self-select into the hard and higher-paid piece-rate task earn more. 2) Task Assignment Effect. We compare earnings
within women (men) who chose the same task yet were assigned different tasks to investigate whether, controlling for
self-selection, working on the hard and higher-paid piece-rate task impacts one’s earnings. 3) Gender Effect. We compare
earnings between men and women who chose the same and were assigned the same task to study whether women earn
differently from men, and explore the determinants of the behavioral difference between men and women.
Our research design identiﬁes multiple channels of earning differences that are caused by different effects that have
not been documented in the literature. The classical experimental design in studying different preferences across genders
normally elicits men and women’s decisions between different environments (see Bracha and Fershtman, 2013; Gneezy

2
Dohmen and Falk (2011) show that this difference in competition could partially be driven by women’s more risk-averse preferences. Thus women
become less likely to choose variable payment schemes than a ﬁxed payment one. Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) point out that women’s lower conﬁdence
in their relative ability may contribute more to their tendency to shy away from competition than risk aversion.
3
While observational data may provide information on the labor market or where individuals ﬁnd their jobs, this data typically bundles a number of
running variables and uncertainty, making it diﬃcult to learn from these data about the net effect of having people choose a different job.
4
The mechanism of how the tasks are assigned to participants is common knowledge explained in the experiment.
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et al., 2009; Niederle and Yestrumskas, 2008). While these studies improve our understanding of how men and women
behave differently in the labor market, they could not address whether earnings difference between genders are caused
by their task choices or being assigned to different task environments.5 Other studies, including Gneezy et al. (2003) and
Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), directly compare men’s and women’s earnings in a competitive task environment and ﬁnd
that a gender earnings gap persists even when the same men and women perform similarly in a non-competitive task.
However, they randomly assign subjects to tasks and thus are not able to isolate the extent to which individuals’ tasks
choices, i.e., the self-selection in the labor market, contribute to the earnings gap between genders. By contrast, our study
elicits participant task choices and thus can explore the earnings impact of assigning a task different from the preferred one.
To our knowledge, our unique research design is the ﬁrst one to directly identify whether any earnings gap is a result of task
choice effect or is an outcome of task assignment effect. We use the ﬁndings from our study to propose that, if the gender
earnings gap is an outcome of working on different types of tasks, scholars and policymakers should devise mechanisms
and policies to mobilize women and/or men to work on the tasks that will improve gender equality, broadly deﬁned.6
Consistent with previous studies, we ﬁnd that men are more likely than women to choose a more diﬃcult task. We
further ﬁnd that task choices for women are driven by their risk preference and competition preference, while task choices
for men are driven by their self-perception of their performance in the tasks. These ﬁndings have important implications.
If men’s task choices are mainly driven by performance considerations, then we would expect a drop in their earnings if
low-performing men who chose the easy task were assigned the hard task they did not prefer. On the other hand, since
women’s task choices are driven by preference considerations - high performance women did not necessarily choose hard
and rewarding tasks - they should show an increase in earnings if women who choose the easy task are assigned the hard
task.
Exploring these conjectures, for men, we ﬁnd that the earnings of those who choose the hard tasks are signiﬁcantly
higher than those who choose the easy task, regardless of their task assignment. In contrast, the earnings of women who are
assigned the diﬃcult task are signiﬁcantly higher than those who are assigned the easy task, regardless of their preference
for tasks. These results suggest the task choice effect on earnings of men but not that of women. Yet, these results also
suggest a task assignment effect on the earnings of women but not on the earnings of men. Importantly, when working
on the same assigned task, women who prefer the hard task show no difference in performance from women who prefer
the easy task. As a result, when women who prefer the easy task are mobilized to work on the non-preferred hard and
rewarding task, they are likely to earn signiﬁcantly more than they would have otherwise earned in the easy tasks. These
are striking ﬁndings that have not been documented in previous studies.
Our ﬁndings make two important contributions to the literature. First, we identify differential effects of task choice and
task assignment on men and women. Our ﬁndings suggest that the gender earnings gap could partially be driven by the
fact that high ability women may not choose a diﬃcult, better-paying task due to preferences differences between genders.
This is different than the pattern of men’s task choice, which is based on performance considerations. It further implies
that policies and mechanisms to decrease the gender earnings gap should take into consideration that the driving factors
that affect the job choices and earnings outcomes for women and men are different. We do not include gender competitions or tournament payment schemes in our research design to minimize the inﬂuence of gender differences in engaging
in competition (e.g. see a review by Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011) on their task selection process and task performance
(Gneezy et al., 2003 and Shurchkov, 2012). To identify the task choice effect and task assignment effect and to investigate
whether mobilizing women to work on the hard and rewarding task is an effective way to reduce the gender earnings gap,
our study is designed as a ﬁrst step toward exploring this important but unanswered question. Our new ﬁndings and the
identiﬁed effects are consistent with the wisdom and results in the broader gender literature, both of those exploring gender
differences in competitive environments (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) and those in a noncompetitive setting (e.g.,
Cook et al., 2020), in that the gender differences in task choices should lead to considerable subsequent effects on their
earnings.
Second, the results of our study provide scholarly support for workplace mechanisms that provide greater opportunity
for female employees to obtain more challenging and rewarding positions.7 While this is a normative argument that is not
new in and of itself, scholarly evidence in support of this argument is still limited in the political sphere. Several previous
studies examine the impact of Aﬃrmative Action (i.e., gender quotas) in a tournament context. In one study, gender quotas
are found to encourage women to enter a tournament environment (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012). Other studies ﬁnd that
introducing the quota in the later stage makes the quota more effective (Czibor and Dominguez Martinez, 2019; Maggian
et al., 2020). These studies further ﬁnd that quotas encouraging female entrants do not hurt the selection of top performers
in the tournament. While these studies examine the effectiveness of gender quotas in encouraging participation, they do
not directly address the issue of the gender earnings gap, and thus cannot answer whether (and in what ways) the earning difference can be improved by mobilizing women to work on a different task. Ours is the ﬁrst study, to the best of

5
For instance, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) ﬁnd that men and women earn the same in piece rate, yet men are more likely to select a competitive
pay scheme (i.e., tournament). However, they do not further compare whether men and women earn differently in a tournament context, which would in
any case not distinguish whether earnings are due to participant preference or the compensation scheme.
6
While we focus on the effect of task choice and task assignment on the gender earnings gap, earnings and jobs are closely associated with other forms
of gender inequality.
7
The qualitative implications of our results focus on the examination of the mechanism behind policies rather than the policies per se.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Experimental Design.

our knowledge, that directly tests whether assigning women to a male-preferred diﬃcult task increases their earnings and
decreases the gender wage gap.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reports our experimental design. We analyze the experimental results
and interpret their implications in Section 3. Our discussion and robustness checks are reported in Section 4. We conclude
in Section 5.

2. Research design
In our study, we examine the impact of gender differences on task choices and integrate these ﬁndings into an experimental design that explores the relationship between task choice, task assignment, and earnings by gender. We elicit
individuals’ task choices, then establish a counterfactual to observe how women (and men) would have performed had their
task choice been different.
To measure task choices, we ask participants whether they prefer to work on an easy and lower-paid piece-rate task or
a challenging but higher-paid piece-rate task. These tasks are neutrally framed as Task A and Task B in the experiment. One
of the strengths of our research design is that after eliciting the participants’ preferred tasks, a computer program randomly
assigns tasks such that about 55% of participants are assigned their preferred tasks, while about 45% of the participants are
assigned to their non-preferred tasks. Thus, while participants endogenously choose their preferred task, the assignment of
the task is exogenous and random.
The procedure of our experiment is outlined in Fig. 1. First, in Step 1 of the experiment, participants are given sample
questions of the two types of tasks they could potentially perform in the experiment. Participants are given detailed instructions on each type of task and they have ﬁve minutes to solve each type of sample question — a total of ten minutes for
two types of sample questions. Participants are not paid for solving sample questions. The sample questions are used only
to inform participants about the characteristics of the two tasks.
In Step 2 of the experiment, participants are given detailed information on the piece rate for solving each type of task and
asked to indicate which task they would prefer to work on. For solving each question correctly in Task A (Task B), a subject is
4
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Fig. 2. Intuition for Identiﬁcation Strategy.

paid a low (high) piece-rate wage.8 There is no uncertainty about the payment scheme. Conditional on the task assignment,
the question diﬃculty level remains constant throughout the session. Prior to indicating their task choice, participants are
informed they may or may not receive their preferred task. It is important to note that, while the assignment of a task is
exogenous and random in our experiment, participants have an incentive to truthfully choose their preferred task because
they are informed they are more likely to be assigned the task that they prefer to work on.9
In Step 3 of the experiment, after participants indicate which task they preferred, the computer program randomly assigned each participant their task. In Step 4, participants work individually on their assigned tasks by solving as many
questions as they can within 10 minutes. When Step 4 is completed, there is a short post-treatment survey in which we
collect demographic information and general risk and competition preferences.
2.1. Identiﬁcation strategy
A stylized example, illustrated in Fig. 2, captures the heart of our identiﬁcation strategy.10 By controlling for self-selection
on task choice, we can identify whether differences in earnings are driven by men’s and women’s task choices versus their
actual task assignments. Based on our novel design, we can isolate several distinctive channels that may contribute to the
gender earnings gap.
Task Choice Effect: We isolate the different outcomes that are caused by different choices of the easy and hard task.
Speciﬁcally, we compare earnings within men (women) who are assigned the same task, yet prefer different tasks.
Task Assignment Effect: We identify whether any earnings difference is driven by the task assignment. Speciﬁcally, we
compare earnings within men (women) who prefer the same task yet are assigned to different tasks.

8
We calculated the piece rate for each task based on individual performance in completing tasks of varying diﬃculty in the pilot sessions. We chose two
tasks that subjects can handle but clearly varied in diﬃculty levels. Online Appendix B provides details of the pilot sessions. Subjects in our experiments
were not informed of our calibration of the wage in the pilot sessions since we wish to limit the role of this calibration information may have played on
their task choice and performance. Additional information about how payments were calibrated might elicit choices according to social conformity and/or
social comparison, despite our efforts to control those behaviors. Moreover, we also do not know whether this information about how payments were
calibrated would interact with preferences and characteristics to affect choices and performance.
9
We told participants that they were more likely to be assigned their preferred task, but withheld the exact likelihood until after they chose a task.
We avoided giving an exact number because misperceptions about probabilities can inﬂuence decisions involving probabilities (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Albert, 2003 and Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010).
10
The sample size of each subgroup is indicated in the triangles. The sample size of Experiment I (II) is reported outside (inside) of parentheses. We
report more information on the treatments and their sample sizes in the following sections.
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Gender Effect: We disentangle the earnings difference between men and women that are not correlated with Task Choice
Effect or Task Assignment Effect. Speciﬁcally, we compare earnings between men and women who prefer the same task and
are assigned the same task. We also explore the determinants of the difference of task choice between men and women,
which may indirectly contributes to the observed earnings difference.
It is worth clarifying that subjects who chose the same tasks can be randomly assigned to different tasks, comparing
the performance of subjects who were assigned their preferred tasks with the performance of subjects who were assigned
their non-preferred tasks, we can generate an appropriate counterfactual to observe how individuals would have performed
had their task choice been different. The randomization strategy allows us to study performance differences at the aggregate
level and investigate the average task choice effect and the task assignment effect. Conditional on the same task choice, we
controlled for the hidden characteristics (e.g. including ability) that may explain task choice and earnings differences.
Overall, by comparing the differences within each gender subgroup and between the two gender subgroups, we can
separate potential mechanisms driving the gender earnings gap. Through our unique identiﬁcation strategy, we can test
whether a simple policy intervention works for gender equality in earnings. We explore our research questions in a noncompetitive setting for two reasons. First, women have been shown to avoid competition more frequently than men do (see
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011 for a review). Thus gender differences in willingness to compete would inﬂuence task choice,
in addition to task diﬃculty, which confounds the identiﬁcation of the task choice effect. Second, a competitive setting
is inappropriate for exploring the task assignment effect because gender differences in willingness to compete may cause
men and women to perform differently. For instance, men are more willing to compete and tend to outperform women
in competitive settings (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003 and Shurchkov, 2012). Thus, if we observed men and women performed
differently on different tasks, we could not identify whether the competitive setting or the task assignment effect caused
the performance differences.
2.2. Experiments and tasks
Previous literature demonstrates that task stereotypes inﬂuence men’s and women’s decisions, and potentially their earnings (e.g. Dreber et al., 2014 and Gneezy et al., 2003). Mathematical tasks are often considered male-typed tasks whereas
verbal tasks are often considered neutral or female-typed. All else equal, while men might over-perform in a male-typed
task, women perform as well as men in a female-typed task (e.g. Günther et al., 2010 and Shurchkov, 2012). While the results
of task stereotypes are often explored in studies with tournaments and competition, little gender differences of performance
in a stylized experiment have been found under piece rate (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). None of the previous studies have explored the task choice and task assignment effects with different task stereotypes. As a result, we investigate
whether those effects inﬂuenced the gender earnings gap by conducting Experiment I with math puzzles and Experiment II
with verbal puzzles. Through employing these two task stereotypes, we can identify the extent to which stereotype plays a
role in our results.11
2.2.1. Experiment I: Math puzzles
In Experiment I, we use a variation of the number addition game developed by Ariely et al. (2009). In this game, participants are given a set of matrices with 12 numbers in each matrix. See Fig. 3 for an example. Participants are then asked to
ﬁnd the numbers in the given matrix that add up to 10. Participants may solve as many matrices as they are able to within
the 10-minute time limit. Participants are given one matrix at a time. Once a participant selects the numbers and submits
her or his choices, the computer displays the next matrix (drawn from a prepared question set) for the participant. Participants are not informed about whether their answers are correct after they submit each question. In Task A, the objective
is to select two numbers that add exactly to 10, while in Task B, the objective is to select three numbers that add exactly
to 10. Since each matrix has a unique solution, Task B is relatively more challenging than Task A. At the beginning of the
experiment, each participant can use up to 10 minutes for practice, with up to 5 minutes to solve 2 sample questions for
each task.12 For solving each question correctly in Task A (Task B), a subject is paid 0.4 (1.4) US dollars. After participants
indicate their preferred task and the computer randomly assigns a task, participants work on the assigned task for 10 minutes. After the ﬁrst 10-minute period has elapsed, participants are given another 10 minutes to work on the same assigned
task but with new questions. Participants are paid based on their performance in one of these two 10-minute tasks; each
10-minute task is equally likely to be chosen.13
2.2.2. Experiment II: Verbal puzzles
In Experiment II, we use a Word-in-a-Word puzzle where players must form sub-words from the letters of a larger
puzzle word.14 Performance is measured based on the number of sub-words entered. Only the words that can be found in
11

We conducted a survey to explore subjects’ beliefs of the task stereotypes. The result of this survey is reported in the Online Appendix A4.
We controlled for the number of practice questions to avoid potential differences in learning between women and men.
13
We can investigate the difference of learning effects between men and women by comparing their performance in the First Try and with it in the
Second Try. We explore more about this point in Online Appendices A1 and A2.
14
All puzzles were computerized using z-Tree Fischbacher (2007). The framework of our verbal tasks is similar to the verbal task used by
Shurchkov (2012). The rules of the verbal tasks are similar to the games provided by the website www.wordplays.com.
12
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Fig. 3. Examples of Task A (Easy) and Task B (Hard).

a standard dictionary are counted. Participants’ performance is measured based on the total number of correct sub-words
they found within the 10-minute time limit. In both Task A and Task B, participants are given the same puzzle words. Task
A and Task B differ in terms of the number of letters required in a sub-word.
In Task A, participants are asked to ﬁnd three-letter sub-words. As an example, consider the puzzle word carriageway.
A three-letter sub-word from carriageway could be (but are not limited to) “age, car, cry, or war.” However, in Task B, they
are asked to ﬁnd the sub-words that consist of at least 5 letters. For example, for the puzzle word carriageway, correct
sub-words include (but are not limited to) “cigar, grace, raceway, or carriage.” For solving each question correctly in Task
A (Task B), a subject is paid 0.1 (0.25) US dollars. Screenshots, instructions, and detailed scoring rules of these two verbal
tasks can be found in the Online Appendices C2 and C7. Based on the rules of the Word-in-a-Word puzzle games and the
empirical results we observed in our pilot sessions, Task B is more diﬃcult than Task A. At the beginning of the experiment,
each participant was given a total of 10 minutes, with up to 5 minutes to solve a practice puzzle of each type of task. The
sub-words solved in the practice are not paid. After participants indicate their preferred task and the computer randomly
assigns a task, participants work on the assigned task for 10 minutes. They are paid based on their performance within the
time limit. There is no repetition of the 10-minute workload.
In both Experiment I and Experiment II, Task A and Task B are designed in a way such that the essentials are similar,
but the levels of diﬃculty differ. Following the literature (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2011; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012 and
Shurchkov, 2012), for both experiments, we use participants’ performance in practice as a baseline measurement of ability
in solving tasks. As stated in Introduction, we wish to make it salient to the participants that Task A is relatively easier
(henceforth, the easy task) while Task B is relatively harder (henceforth, the hard task). Moreover, since we used the same
design of the easy and hard tasks and the same randomization strategy in both Experiment I (math tasks) and Experiment
II (verbal tasks), the ﬁndings of the two experiments can be compared qualitatively. Then we can investigate the role of task
stereotypes in the interpretation of our ﬁndings. As we use a piece-rate payment scheme and there is no uncertainty about
the value of each correctly-solved question for each task, we avoid any risk preference impact on participant calculations.
It also makes the experiment simple for the participants to understand and enables us to use the participants’ earnings to
investigate eﬃciency.
7
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2.3. Subjects and procedures
The experiments were conducted at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory at Florida State University with subjects who are registered undergraduate students at the university. The experiments were programmed using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted via a computerized network. Subjects were seated at individual computer terminals and
not allowed to see other subjects’ choices.15 A total of 508 undergraduate student subjects participated in our study. One
hundred and seventy-seven subjects participated in Experiment I, one hundred and eighty-seven subjects participated in
Experiment II, thirty-ﬁve subjects participated in Experiment III (reported in detail in the Online Appendix A4), sixty-seven
subjects participated in our pilot sessions, and forty-two subjects who did not participated in Experiments I, II, or III answered our survey on task stereotypes. No subject participated in more than one session. Average earnings were about $17
($11) in Experiment I (II) in which a $5 show-up payment was included. Sessions for Experiments I and II included 10 to
25 participants. We report additional information on the experiment instructions and how we conduct the pilot sessions in
the Online Appendices B1, B2, and C1.
3. Empirical analysis
In this section, we present the main results from our experiment regarding the task performance and earnings for the
full sample and earnings subsetted by gender. We ﬁrst report the aggregate results by gender and then report the results
of our analysis of the effect of assigning men and women to different tasks. Given the higher diﬃculty of the hard task, we
expect subjects assigned to this task to solve fewer questions correctly. We note that a subject assigned to the easy task
may solve enough questions such that the earnings of the two tasks are not signiﬁcantly different. In this study, subjects’
earnings are a linear function of their performance on the assigned task. To facilitate our comparison of the treatment
effects, in the following discussion, we use subjects’ earnings as our main outcome variable. Unless otherwise noted, we use
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney statistical tests to examine the differences between subgroups.
We begin by examining our aggregate results related to male and female participants’ task performance and earnings
levels. We ﬁrst examine the Task Choice Effect and investigate whether those who prefer the hard task earn more than
those who prefer the easy task.16 Examining the results of Experiment I (math) by gender, we ﬁnd that the average earnings
of male participants assigned their preferred hard task are $13.8, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the $7.4 earned by male
participants who prefer the easy task yet assigned the hard task ( p < .001). Similarly, we ﬁnd that the average earnings of
men who prefer the hard task yet assigned the easy task are $13.7, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the $10.9 earned by
male participants assigned their preferred easy task ( p = .044).
We ﬁnd qualitatively the same pattern on the Task Choice Effect in Experiment II (verbal) for men. The average earnings
of male participants assigned their preferred hard task are $8.3, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the $3.3 earned by male
participants who prefer the easy task yet assigned the hard task ( p = .002). The average earnings of men who preferred the
hard task yet assigned the easy task are signiﬁcantly higher than the earnings of male participants assigned their preferred
easy task ($7.0 versus $4.6, p = .012).
These results suggest that our male participants’ preference for the hard task is correlated with a generally better performance in solving the questions in our study, regardless of the task to which they are assigned. Moreover, our data also
suggests that the task choice effect on men is consistent across task stereotypes. This leads us to state our ﬁrst result.
Result 1 (Task Choice Effect) Male participants’ earnings are correlated with their initial task choice. Those who prefer
the hard task on average perform better, and thus, earn more than those who prefer the easy task. This result is robust to
whether they are assigned the easy or the hard task and whether they work on the math tasks or verbal tasks.
We further examine the task choice effect among our female participants and ﬁnd that in Experiment I female participants who work on their preferred hard task earn $13.3, which is not signiﬁcantly different from the $13.2 earned by those
who prefer the easy task yet assigned the hard task ( p = .92). We further ﬁnd that female participants who prefer the hard
task yet assigned the easy task earn $10.6, which is not signiﬁcantly different from the $10.0 earned by those assigned their
preferred easy task ( p = .68). The results of Experiment II demonstrate a similar pattern among women. That is, we do not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant differences between the earnings of those who prefer the hard task and work on the hard task and
those who prefer the easy task and work on the hard task ($8.4 versus $7.5, p = .73). We also do not ﬁnd any evidence that
female participants who prefer the hard task yet assigned the easy task earn signiﬁcantly different from those assigned their
preferred easy task ($4.7 versus $4.1, p = .15). In other words, female participants assigned the same task earn statistically
15
Experiment I was conducted in the laboratory. Experiment II and Experiment III were conducted over the internet using unleashed z-Tree (Duch et al.,
2020). Experiment III is identical to Experiment I except that participants are always assigned the task that they choose and thus absent of any randomization process. Details are reported in the Online Appendix A3. Participants of both Experiment I and Experiment II/III were recruited from the same subject
pool of the XS/FS Experimental Social Science Laboratory. We implemented the same standard of experimental economics and used the same protocols to
conduct those experiments. Additional details of the experimentation are reported in the Online Appendix C3.
16
As stated, in our Experiment I, each participant is assigned a task that he or she works on in two subsequent 10-minute sessions, each with a new set
of questions. The results of Experiment I reported in this section are the results for the ﬁrst 10 minutes. The results of each 10 minutes are qualitatively
the same. Whether we pool the data of the 20 minutes together or analyze them separately, the main ﬁndings of our study are consistent.
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Fig. 4. Earnings for Participants who Prefer the Hard Task (dark grey) versus those who Prefer the Easy Task (light grey). Note: The numbers at the top
of the bars are the average dollar amount earned by the participants under that bar. The numbers at the bottom of the bar are the sample size of that
treatment. The label below each set of the bar shows whether the participants are assigned to the hard or the easy task. The two left (right) sets of bars
reﬂect male (female) earnings.

the same regardless of their initial task choices. These results suggest that, on average, female participants’ task choices are
not correlated with their earnings, which is different from the result obtained for our male participants. This leads to our
statement of Result 2, followed by our depiction of Results 1 and 2 in Fig. 4.
Result 2 (Task Choice Effect) Female subjects’ earnings are not correlated with their initial task choice. When working on
the same assigned task, female participants who initially prefer the easy task perform (and thus earn) no differently from
female participants who initially prefer the hard task. This result is robust to whether they work on math tasks or verbal
tasks.
We next examine the Task Assignment Effect and investigate whether being assigned a hard task makes a difference in
men’s and women’s earnings in math and verbal tasks. The results of Experiment I show that male participants who prefer
the hard task earn about the same when they are assigned the hard as compared to when they are assigned the easy task
($13.8 versus $13.7, p = .84). By contrast, male participants who prefer the easy task earn signiﬁcantly less when they are
assigned the hard as compared to when they are assigned the easy task ($7.4 versus $10.9, p = .015).
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Examining the results of Experiment II, we continue to ﬁnd those male participants who prefer the hard task earn about
the same when they are assigned the hard as compared to when they are assigned the easy task ($8.3 versus $7.0, p = .39).
Male participants who prefer the easy task earn less when they are assigned the hard as compared to when they are
assigned the easy task, but the differences in earnings are not statistically signiﬁcant ($3.3 versus $4.6, p = .11). While the
task assignment effect on earnings of male participants who prefer the easy task is signiﬁcant only when they work on
math tasks, the direction that the task assignment intervention has a negative effect on earnings of those who prefer the
easy task is the same across Experiment I and Experiment II.
It is worth noting that, in both Experiment I and Experiment II, the easy and hard tasks require the same solving process
and differ only in the level of diﬃculty. Hence, it is not surprising to ﬁnd those male participants who prefer the hard task
earn the same regardless of their task assignment. However, male participants who prefer the easy task are not necessarily
capable of solving the hard task and thus earn signiﬁcantly more when they are assigned the easy task than when they are
assigned the hard task. This leads to our statement of our third result.
Result 3 (Task Assignment Effect) Male participants’ earnings, whether they are assigned easy or hard tasks, are not statistically different if they prefer the hard task. Their earnings are lower if they prefer the easy task but are assigned the
hard task, although the earnings’ differences are only signiﬁcant in the math tasks but not statistically distinguishable in
the verbal tasks.
We now turn to the task assignment effect for our female participants. The results of Experiment I show that female
participants who are assigned the hard task earn more than those who are assigned the easy task, whether they prefer the
hard task ($13.3 versus $10.6, p = .057) or the easy task ($13.2 versus $10.0, p = .041). The results of Experiment II show
a similar pattern. That is, female participants earn more when they are assigned the hard task, whether they prefer the
easy task ($7.5 versus $4.1, p = .001) or the hard task ($8.4 versus $4.7, p = .04). The results further suggest that female
participants are able to adapt when assigned a task, regardless of which task they initially preferred. In particular, it is likely
that female participants with high solving ability in our math and/or verbal tasks who may prefer the easy task will perform
well if assigned the hard task, leading to an improvement in their earnings. This leads to our statement of our fourth result.
Result 4 (Task Assignment Effect) When female participants are assigned the hard task, their earnings are higher as compared to being assigned the easy task, whether they prefer the easy task or the hard task. This result is robust to whether
they work on math tasks or verbal tasks.
These reported aggregate task choice effect and task assignment effect are subject to the inﬂuence of participants’ ability
in solving those tasks. To examine the extent to which our ﬁndings are inﬂuenced by participants’ differences in ability, we
conduct OLS regressions and analyze the inﬂuence of an individual’s preferred versus assigned task on earnings. The results
are reported in Table 1. PreferHard is a binary indicator that reﬂects whether a subject prefers the hard task, AssignedHard is
a binary indicator that reﬂects whether a subject is assigned the hard task. TaskAPractice and TaskBPractice are the number
of questions solved correctly in the practice phase, which we use as an estimate of an individuals’ ability in solving those
tasks. SelfPerception is individuals’ self-reported belief of the percentage of questions they have answered correctly. This
information is elicited after participants have ﬁnished the assigned task yet before they are informed about their actual
performance and ﬁnal earnings.
The results reported in Table 1 are consistent with the task choice effect and task assignment effect, suggesting that
our main ﬁndings are robust to the check of participants’ practice performance in solving these tasks. That is, for female
participants, their earnings are affected by whether they are assigned the hard task regardless of which task they initially
prefer. For instance, in a 10-minute session, depending on whether working on math or verbal tasks, women assigned the
hard task earn about $3.3 to $3.4 more than those assigned the easy task. We further observe that whether we control
for the number of solved questions in Task A and B in the practice phase, the task assignment effect has a consistently
signiﬁcant impact on female participants’ earnings. However, whether they prefer the easy task or the hard task has little
correlation with their earnings. This contrasts with the ﬁndings from our male participants, who show a positive task choice
effect on their earnings. Depending on whether working on math or verbal tasks, men who prefer the hard task earn $2.3 to
$2.4 more than those who prefer the easy task. Moreover, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between the number of questions
solved correctly in the practice stage and higher earnings beyond that related to PreferHard or AssignedHard, suggesting
that participants’ earnings are correlated with their baseline ability in solving questions, which is most evident in their
performance in solving the hard questions (Task B) in our experiments. Although the correlation is not always statistically
signiﬁcant (i.e. p-value< 0.05), the pattern of the positive correlations is the same across task stereotypes and genders.
We also ﬁnd a positive correlation between self-perception of performance and earnings, but it is not always statistically
signiﬁcant when being combined with other driving factors.
To further explore our ﬁndings that women earn more on the hard task regardless of the task they initially preferred,
whereas men who prefer the easy task earn less if assigned to the hard task, we consider whether our female and male
subjects differ in their ability to solve the task. To examine the Gender Effect, we ﬁrst compare the earnings of women
and men who are assigned their preferred hard task and ﬁnd that their average earnings are statistically indistinguishable
both in Experiment I ($13.8 versus $13.3, p = .88) and in Experiment II ($8.3 versus $8.4, p = .99). Similarly, when we
compare the earnings of women and men assigned their preferred easy task, we ﬁnd that their earnings are statistically
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Table 1
Analysis of the Inﬂuence of Preferred and Assigned Task on Earnings.
Panel A: Female
Variables

Math
(1)

Verbal
(2)

(3)

PreferHard

(4)

0.054∗ ∗ ∗
(0.020)

TaskAPractice
TaskBPractice
Control Varibles
Observations
R-squared

(6)

(7)

0.298
(1.132)

AssignedHard
SelfPerception

(5)

No
90
0.058

0.688
(1.150)
1.572∗ ∗
(0.646)
No
90
0.077

0.038
(0.036)
0.409
(1.458)
1.153
(0.932)
Yes
90
0.329

(8)

0.058
(0.991)
3.426∗ ∗ ∗
(0.931)
0.073†
(0.037)
0.134
(1.277)
0.579
(0.724)
Yes
90
0.447

No
98
0.019

0.053
(0.069)
0.260†
(0.141)
No
98
0.097

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.031
(0.020)

0.044∗ ∗
(0.021)
0.088
(0.069)
0.223
(0.139)
Yes
98
0.226

3.293∗ ∗ ∗
(0.721)
0.027
(0.019)
0.099
(0.067)
0.205†
(0.115)
Yes
98
0.376

Panel B: Male
Variables

Math
(1)

(2)

Verbal

(3)
∗∗

PreferHard

SelfPerception

0.070∗ ∗
(0.029)

TaskAPractice
TaskBPractice
Control Varibles
Observations
R-squared

No
87
0.054

5.622∗ ∗ ∗
(0.529)
2.588∗ ∗ ∗
(0.710)
No
87
0.117

0.039†
(0.021)
3.439∗ ∗
(1.603)
0.597
(0.804)
Yes
87
0.555

(8)
∗∗

2.335
(1.103)

AssignedHard

(7)
2.437
(0.946)

-1.456
(1.054)
0.030
(0.026)
3.902∗ ∗
(1.711)
1.550∗ ∗
(0.774)
Yes
87
0.536

0.107∗ ∗ ∗
(0.020)

No
89
0.187

0.057
(0.091)
0.312∗ ∗ ∗
(0.095)
No
89
0.192

0.022
(0.028)
0.069
(0.091)
0.219∗ ∗
(0.109)
Yes
89
0.389

0.206
(0.827)
0.075∗ ∗ ∗
(0.024)
0.052
(0.096)
0.258∗ ∗
(0.113)
Yes
89
0.350

Note: OLS speciﬁcation. Dependent variable: Earnings in US dollars. Panel A reports the results of female subjects
and Panel B reports the results of male subjects. PreferHard and AssignedHard are dummy variables that represent the
subjects’ choices and the assigned task. Control variables include Ethnicity, AdvantagedBackground (dummy variable=
1 in Experiment I (math) if the subject’s major involves calculations; dummy variable= 1 in Experiment II (verbal) if
the subject is a native speaker), session variables (i.e. session effects caused by gender compositions detailed in the
Online Appendix C4), and cognitive reﬂection test scores (based on Frederick, 2005 detailed in the Online Appendix
C6). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of signiﬁcance: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, † p < .1.

indistinguishable both in Experiment I ($10.9 versus $10, p = .45) and in Experiment II ($4.6 versus $4.1, p = .42). In Fig. 5,
we report the Kernel density distribution of men’s and women’s earnings. An F-test comparing the standard deviations
across women and men and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test comparing the general distribution of earnings each show no
signiﬁcant difference in the distribution of earnings between women and men at a conventional signiﬁcance level. Overall,
our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Dreber et al. (2014) that, in general, men
and women exhibit similar abilities in solving simple experimental tasks in non-competitive environment. We now state
our ﬁfth result.
Result 5 (Gender Effect) Men and women who are assigned their preferred tasks earn the same amount of earnings in both
math and verbal tasks.
Although there is no gender difference in performance, we ﬁnd clear evidence that men are more likely to choose the
hard and higher-paid task than women. That is, among the 364 participants who participated in Experiment I or Experiment
II, 58% of men choose the hard task, but only 43% of women choose the hard task (Pearson chi-square test, p = .005). When
we further break down the choices by task stereotypes, we ﬁnd mixed results. In Experiment I (math), 57% of men choose
the hard task while 49% of women choose the easy task (Pearson chi-square test, p = .253). In Experiment II (verbal), 56%
of men choose the hard task while 36% of women choose the easy task (Pearson chi-square test, p = .005). Despite the
insigniﬁcance of gender difference in task choice in Experiment I, the direction of the choice difference between men and
women is consistent with that in Experiment II. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the observations reported in Niederle and
Yestrumskas (2008) and Bracha and Fershtman (2013) who ﬁnd men are more likely to choose (or spend longer time on)
the more challenging task. This leads to our sixth result.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of Earnings by Gender and Task Assignment. Note: The horizontal line shows earnings by gender while the vertical line shows the
Kernel density. The panel on the left (right) shows the earnings density distribution for men and women who are assigned their preferred easy (hard) task.

Result 6 (Gender Effect) In general, men are more likely to choose the challenging and higher-paid tasks than women,
even if men and women have no difference in their performance in such tasks.
Based on Results 5 and 6, we see that men and women perform about the same in both easy and hard tasks regardless of
in Experiment I or Experiment II, but men choose hard and higher-paid tasks more frequently than women. It is likely that
some women, whose performance are similar to men shy away from more challenging tasks and are thus under-represented
in such tasks given their ability. All else equal, the under-representation is likely to result in gender differences in economic
outcomes and potentially lead to a signiﬁcant gender earnings gap. Importantly, our results imply that women’s earnings
are shaped by the task assignment rather than their task choice. We ﬁnd no evidence showing that female participants’
task choices are correlated with their potential performance and consequent earnings. By contrast, we ﬁnd that men’s earnings are shaped by their task choice. From a policy perspective, our ﬁndings suggest that enabling women to take on more
challenging tasks can improve their earnings, but motivating men to do so may have little or even a negative impact on theirs
depending on their task preference.
Our results also lend insight to gender quota policies by providing scholarly data that supports the idea that increasing
and reserving more positions and opportunities for women in challenging and rewarding jobs may improve the earnings
of women without hurting the interests of men. From a workplace standpoint, the effectiveness of a quota system (e.g.
Aﬃrmative Action) is controversial (Balafoutas et al., 2016). Debates have resulted in some states banning aﬃrmative action
policies. The main criticism is the concern that such policies may lead to reverse discrimination (e.g. enhance women’s
welfare at the cost of men). However, our results suggest that such policies may not necessarily hurt the beneﬁts of men
at the aggregate level, since the men in our study who preferred the harder tasks earned the same payment whether they
are assigned the hard task or the easy task. It is essential to notice that reserving opportunities for competent women
should not affect competent men who prefer the hard task since the task assignment effect has little inﬂuence on their
earnings. Given the observation that the task assignment intervention seems to negatively affect the earnings of those men
assigned the hard task but prefer the easy task, analyzing the differential effects of task choice and task assignment on
men and women could be beneﬁcial to evaluate policies such as Aﬃrmative Action. Based on the results of our study,
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task assignment intervention is likely to effectively reduce the gender earnings gap between men and women. To facilitate
our solutions to addressing the research questions proposed in the Introduction, there are no gender competitions in our
setting. Our results may not explain the gender earnings gap in labor markets in which there is serious competition between
genders. While there are a number of differences between our laboratory experimental setting and the workplace context,
our results suggest that policies aimed at reducing the gender earnings gap may apply different strategies toward men and
women.

4. Discussion
The results of our experiments show evidence of a task choice effect on men’s earnings and task assignment effect on
women’s earnings. We ﬁnd that women under-represented in harder and higher-paying jobs can result in a gender earnings
gap, even in an environment absent of competition. Moreover, across different task stereotypes, women are likely to earn
signiﬁcantly more if they work on the harder and higher-paid task that most women in our study did not choose in the
ﬁrst place. In this section, we address some additional results from our experiments and examine a few explanations that
may contribute to the differential task choice and task assignment effects on men and women. First, we examine whether
factors including risk preferences, willingness to engage in competition, and self-perception affect men’s and women’s task
choice decisions differently. Second, we exploit the participants’ performance in the practice to investigate whether the
choice differences between men and women cause differences in earnings in the experiment.
Before continuing our discussion, we note that in the Online Appendix A3, we report the results of a robustness check,
Experiment III, that we conducted to explore whether being assigned the preferred task in a randomization procedure in
Experiment I may lead participants to perform differently. Experiment III is identical to Experiment I except that participants
are always assigned the task that they choose and thus absent of any randomization process. By comparing the performance
results of those assigned their preferred tasks in Experiment I with the performance results of participants who always work
on the task they choose in Experiment III, we ﬁnd little evidence that being assigned to their preferred task plays a role in
performance. Moreover, we ﬁnd that our main results are robust to session effects regardless of the stereotype of the task
and we report those additional results in the Online Appendix C4.

4.1. Determinants of Men’s and Women’s task choices
We start our discussion by examining the conjecture that men and women may make task choice decisions based on
different considerations. A number of studies have found that men and women differ in their risk preferences, willingness
to engage in competition, and level of conﬁdence (see a review by Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Given that men and women
have similar performance in solving the easy and hard tasks, but men are signiﬁcantly more likely to choose the hard and
rewarding tasks than women, it is natural to suspect that women’s choices are driven by something different from that
of men’s. To explore this conjecture, we develop a Logit choice model and use the data from our unincentivized postexperiment survey to measure risk preference, willingness to engage in competition and self-perception of performance (as
a proxy of conﬁdence).
The results of the Logit regressions are reported in Table 2. Female is a binary indicator to represent a subject’s gender,
TaskAPractice and TaskBPractice is the number of questions solved correctly in the practice phase. RiskSeeking and CompetitionPreferences are continuous variables on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the least and 10 the most. Self-Perception
is individuals’ self-reported belief of the percentage of questions they have answered correctly.
Based on the results reported in Table 2, we ﬁnd that TaskBPractice has a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the choice
of the hard task among men and women, which suggests that individuals’ baseline ability in solving the hard tasks are
positively correlated with their choice of the hard task. The more hard questions they solve in the practice phase, the more
likely they are to choose the hard task. This is true for both men and women in both math and verbal tasks.
Examining our ﬁndings by gender, we ﬁnd that risk preferences have no signiﬁcant effect on men’s task choice, but a
signiﬁcantly positive effect on women’s choices of the hard task. Moreover, we ﬁnd SelfPerception inﬂuences only men’s
choice of a hard task, but not that of women. If we regard this self-perception as a proxy of conﬁdence or consideration
of ability, then these results suggest that men who perceived themselves good at solving the hard task are more likely to
choose the hard task, but women who perceived themselves good at solving the hard task are not necessarily more likely to
choose the hard task. Importantly, our research design contains no element of risk (e.g. as that in a lottery payment scheme)
or competition (e.g. as that in a tournament), which means women’s task choices are inﬂuenced by preferences that are
independent of the nature of the tasks. Our ﬁndings imply that both women’s and men’s performance in solving the hard
task inﬂuences their decisions to choose the hard task, but women’s choices of hard tasks are further inﬂuenced by their
risk preferences and sometimes their willingness to engage in competition. In contrast, neither men’s risk preference nor
their competition preference have any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on their choice of the hard tasks. Instead, men’s self-perception
of performance is positively correlated with their choice of a hard task. Hence, we ﬁnd suggestive evidence that men’s
choice of the hard tasks are likely based on considerations of whether they can perform well in the tasks, whereas women’s
choices are not driven by such considerations.
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Table 2
Predictive Analysis of Choosing the Hard Task (Logit Model, Marginal Effect).
Panel A: Female
Variables

Math
(1)

RiskSeeking
CompetionPreference

Verbal
(2)

(4)

(5)
0.066∗ ∗ ∗
(0.026)
0.022
(0.025)

-0.176
(0.125)
0.333∗ ∗ ∗
(0.090)
No
90
0.109

0.245∗ ∗ ∗
(0.064)
-0.197∗ ∗ ∗
(0.070)
-0.001
(0.008)
-0.504†
(0.233)
0.577∗ ∗
(0.224)
Yes
90
0.503

No
98
0.081

No
98
0.008

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.035
(0.058)
0.008
(0.059)
0.016∗ ∗
(0.006)

0.062†
(0.034)
0.003
(0.030)

0.115∗ ∗ ∗
(0.044)
-0.088∗ ∗
(0.041)

SelfPerception

0.004
(0.003)

TaskAPractice
TaskBPractice
Control Varibles
Observations
R-squared

(3)

No
90
0.120

No
90
0.017

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.006
(0.008)
0.043∗ ∗ ∗
(0.015)
No
98
0.069

0.066∗ ∗
(0.032)
0.018
(0.034)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.010
(0.010)
0.037∗ ∗
(0.015)
Yes
98
0.234

0.003
(0.003)

Panel B: Male
Variables

Math
(1)

RiskSeeking
CompetionPreference

(2)

Verbal

(3)

0.030
(0.033)
0.015
(0.030)
0.012∗ ∗
(0.005)

SelfPerception

TaskBPractice
Control Varibles
Observations
R-squared

No
87
0.017

No
87
0.067

∗∗∗

0.702
(0.232)
Yes
87
0.400

0.455
(0.126)
No
87
0.143

(8)

-0.010
(0.010)
0.060∗ ∗ ∗
(0.018)
No
89
0.118

0.098
(0.061)
-0.004
(0.035)
0.063∗ ∗
(0.031)
-0.018
(0.018)
0.038∗ ∗
(0.016)
Yes
89
0.615

0.048∗ ∗ ∗
(0.016)

TaskAPractice
∗∗∗

(7)

No
89
0.043

No
89
0.502

Note: Logit speciﬁcation. Dependent variable: Choosing the hard task. The coeﬃcients report the marginal effects of the
Logit regression at the mean. Panel A reports the results of female subjects and Panel B reports the results of male subjects.
In Panel B Columns 3 and 4, because almost all male participants who failed to answer all Task A practice questions
chose the easy task, TaskAPractice is omitted in the regressions. RiskSeeking and CompetitionPreferences are continuous
variables on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the least and 10 the most. Self-Perception is a continuous variable with
values between 0 and 100. Control variables include Ethnicity, AdvantagedBackground (dummy variable= 1 in Experiment
I (math) if the subject’s major involves calculations; dummy variable= 1 in Experiment II (verbal) if the subject is a native
speaker), session variables (i.e. session effects caused by gender compositions detailed in the Online Appendix C4), and
cognitive reﬂection test scores (based on Frederick, 2005 detailed in the Online Appendix C6). Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. Level of signiﬁcance: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, † p < .1.

4.2. Women learn faster than men
The main results of our study suggest that what task women work on has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on their earnings. That
is, women earn more when they are assigned to a hard yet rewarding task. This leads us to expect that women may be
more adaptive to a new task environment. To examine this conjecture, in this section, we investigate whether men and
women differ in their learning.
In Experiment I, each subject participates in two 10-minute task sessions. After a subject completes the ﬁrst 10-minute
session, the computer records the subject’s performance and earnings without informing subjects of their outcomes. The
subject is then given the same task (with different questions) and another 10 minutes in which to work on the task. The
performance and earnings in one of these two 10-minute blocks is randomly and equally likely chosen by the computer to
determine how much pay a subject will receive from the task. For simplicity of exposition, we refer to the ﬁrst 10 minutes
as the First Try and the second 10 minutes as the Second Try.
We ﬁnd that the average earnings in the First (Second) Try are 11.8 (12.9) dollars, suggesting that the average earnings
are signiﬁcantly higher in the Second Try ( p < .001). Examining the results by gender, we ﬁnd women (78%) tend to exhibit
stronger learning effects than men (64%, p = .0496). We ﬁnd that 73% (55%) of men assigned the easy (hard) task receive
more earnings in the Second Try (Pearson chi-square test, p = .071). However, for women, we ﬁnd that 87% (67%) of women
assigned the easy (hard) task receive more earnings in their Second Try (Pearson chi-square test, p = 0.024). When we break
down the analysis by task choice and task assignment, the results are more nuanced. We ﬁnd that when participants work
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on the preferred task, there are no performance (and thus) outcome differences between men and women. However, when
they work on the non-preferred task, women are more likely to exhibit stronger learning effects and receive signiﬁcantly
higher earnings in their Second Try. We report detailed results in the Online Appendix A2. These results provide initial
evidence of the gender learning differences when individuals need to adapt to an unchosen task. However, as a counterfactual comparison, these results should be interpreted with some caution. In particular, fast learners are not necessarily more
adaptive in every possible scenario. While we take women’s faster learning than men as evidence that they are more adaptive, we acknowledge that our measurement may not be the most accurate method. Nevertheless, our results can provide
directions for future research on similar topics.
5. Concluding remarks
In this study, we demonstrate that when women are assigned to a more challenging task, they experience an increase in
earnings, regardless of their task choice or the task stereotypes. In contrast, we ﬁnd that men assigned their non-preferred
hard task experience a reduction in earnings. From these results, we conclude that assigning women more challenging tasks
in the workplace could serve as an effective intervention to improve women’s earnings and thus reduce the gender earnings
gap. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that on top of ability considerations, women’s task choices are further driven by their preferences
while men’s task choices are further driven by their perceptions of their performance in the experimental tasks.
The ﬁndings of our study have strong policy implications. Our study involves tasks with an increasing level of diﬃculty,
such as might be found in the workplace when advancing across one’s career, and can especially provide insight into policies
related to cabinet or top management posts. It is also in line with previous research on the effect of the gender quota system
on promoting high-performing women to engage in a tournament (Niederle et al., 2013). The evidence from our study can
be used to achieve a better understanding of the gender wage gap. By documenting the earnings gains for women from
challenging jobs even if those jobs are not initially preferred, it may encourage women to become more risk-seeking and
more conﬁdent in challenging environments, which will ultimately decrease the gender gap. To mitigate the social and
political obstacles these women may encounter in doing so, the creation of policies and environments that encourage female
workers to choose challenging jobs could assist in reducing the gender earnings gap.
As with any experiment, a level of caution is needed in an interpretation of our results. First, following the studies on
gender (see a recent review by Niederle, 2016), we focus on the difference of earnings between men and women and examine whether mobilizing women to the challenging and rewarding tasks may function as a simple and effective intervention
to reduce the earnings gap. Our investigation may be different from a utilitarian benchmark which would internalize the
possible social costs (including the penalty in terms of marriage and children as demonstrated by Ong et al., 2019) into a
utilitarian welfare function.17 Also, our research is designed to isolate differential effects that may contribute to the gender wage gap. We aim to investigate whether creating environments and encouraging women to engage in challenging and
rewarding tasks will increase gender equity and reduce the gender wage gap. Even within our experimental setting, participants have the option to choose whether to continue when they learn they have been assigned to a non-preferred task.
In the workplace setting, while challenging and rewarding tasks should be made available and even encouraged, employers
should not interpret our results as an indication that such tasks should be mandated. Meanwhile, as a ﬁrst step to investigate whether mobilizing women to work on a challenging and rewarding task reduces gender earnings gap, competition is
absent for the sake of a clean identiﬁcation of effects. Future research may build upon our results by including competition
into the compensation scheme.
In addition, the tasks used in our experiments vary in their levels of diﬃculty and are conducted in a controlled laboratory experiment. In future research, it is important to explore whether the intervention of task assignment has the same
effect when a broader range of participants other than student populations are included. This corresponds with the message
that women should be encouraged to be more open to their job choices and be mobilized to move from one industry to
another. The primary policy implication of this study is that mobilizing women to take on challenging and rewarding tasks
can improve gender equality and reduce the gender earnings gap. These results from the laboratory suggest the need for a
ﬁeld intervention to test this relationship in a less controlled setting.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.
103753
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